Preview
Chinese Economic Reform
Two years after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, it became apparent to many of China's leaders that economic reform
was necessary. During his tenure as China's premier, Mao had encouraged social movements such as the Great Leap
Forward and the Cultural Revolution which had had as their bases ideologies such as serving the people and maintaining
the class struggle. By 1978 "Chinese leaders were searching for a solution to serious economic problems produced by
Hua Guofeng, the man who had succeeded Mao Zedong as CCP leader after Mao's death" (Shirk 35). Hua had
demonstrated a desire to continue the ideologically based movements of Mao. Unfortunately, these movements had left
China in a state where "agriculture was stagnant, industrial production was low, and the people's living standards had not
increased in twenty years" (Nathan 200). This last area was particularly troubling. While "the gross output value of
industry and agriculture increased by 810 percent and national income grew by 420 percent [between 1952 and 1980] ...
average individual income increased by only 100 percent" (Ma Hong quoted in Shirk 28). However, attempts at
economic reform in China were introduced not only due to some kind of generosity on the part of the Chinese Communist
Party to increase the populace's living standards. It had become clear to members of the CCP that economic reform
would fulfill a political purpose as well since the party felt, properly it would seem, that it had suffered a loss of support.
As Susan L. Shirk describes the situation in The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China,
restoring the CCP's prestige required improving
economic performance and raising living standards.
The traumatic experience of the Cultural Revolution
had eroded popular trust in the moral and political
virtue of the CCP. The party's leaders decided to
shift the base of party legitimacy from virtue to
competence, and to do that they had to demonstrate
that they could deliver the goods.
(23)
This movement "from virtue to competence" seemed to mark a serious departure from orthodox Chinese political theory.
Confucius himself had posited in the fifth century BCE that those individuals who best demonstrated what he referred to
as moral force should lead the nation. Using this principle as a guide, China had for centuries attempted to choose at least
its bureaucratic leaders by administering a test to determine their moral force. After the Communist takeover of the
country, Mao continued this emphasis on moral force by demanding that Chinese citizens demonstrate what he referred to
as "correct consciousness." This correct consciousness could be exhibited, Mao believed, by the way people lived.
Needless to say, that which constituted correct consciousness was often determined and assessed by Mao. Nevertheless,
the ideal of moral force was still a potent one in China even after the Communist takeover.
It is noteworthy that Shirk feels that the Chinese Communist Party leaders saw economic reform as a way to regain their
and their party's moral virtue even after Mao's death. Thus, paradoxically, by dem .. nomic Focus in Shanghai: Catching
Up." New York Times: 22 December 1993, A1, A8.
Xu, Zhiming. "The Impact of China's Reform and
Development on the Outside World." Economic Reform
in China: Problems and Prospects. Ed. James A. Dorn
and Wang Xi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1990. 247-253.
Zuckerman, Laurence. "A Foreign Offering's Unsure
Pedigree." New York Times: 11 August 1994, D6.
|
